Russia grows its Asian influence on the back of border conflict

The standoff at the Ukrainian border might seem like a European or American problem, one which will have little direct effect on Australia. However, whatever the outcome it carries important strategic implications for Australia.

Most clearly, it will further intensify Russia’s uneasy alliance with its chief “frenemy”, China. This is clear from last week’s recent joint Russia-China pact, where Russia condemned the AUKUS agreement and stated that Taiwan was “an inalienable part of China”.

But this is only part of the story. The standoff will also push Russia to balance its growing closeness with China by intensifying other alliances in Asia, most notably India. Australian policymakers must think hard to formulate policy to respond to Russia’s flexible and dynamic role in the region.

Russia as an Asian power?

Australians have long viewed Russia as a European power. In 2013 then prime minister Kevin Rudd said: “The reason Australia and Russia have gotten along so well and have no fundamental contradictions is that we’ve hardly had anything to do with each other for the last 70 years.” 

But that is changing. Russia has historical levers of power in Asia, including more than half of its territory in Asia. It also has long-standing ties with India, Vietnam and central Asia. With the collapse of communism in the early 1990s, many of these relationships weakened as Russia’s traditional orientation to Europe returned. 

But driven by progressively worsening relations with Europe and the United States, Russia’s power in Asia has been reviving over the past 20 years. This revival was given a boost in 2014 as Western sanctions forced a Russian pivot to Asian markets. 

The best publicised part of this pivot is Russia’s increasingly close strategic, economic and diplomatic relationship with China. This alliance is an uneasy — and even unlikely — one, leading some to call Russia and China “frenemies”.

First, Russia is inevitably the junior partner, not a position it enjoys. Second, Russia is suspicious of growing Chinese power in central and east Asia and is seeking to counter it. This reflects a longer and deeper problem in the relationship: Russia and China remain key powers competing to control the northern Eurasian landmass. But common interests make strange bedfellows.

Because of this frenemy status, Russia has sought to balance its relationship with China by reengaging with India and expanding ties to ASEAN countries. Just two months ago, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited New Delhi to reinvigorate Russia’s old Cold War relationship with India. This Russia-India relationship has implications elsewhere in Asia. For instance, India is a critical bridgehead to selling Russian technology and arms in ASEAN. Most recently, the Philippines bought a supersonic weapons system developed by BrahMos Aerospace, a joint venture between India and Russia. 

The current standoff

The current standoff at the Russia-Ukraine border represents an important moment in this revival. Whatever happens, it will worsen Russian relations with the European Union and the US. This will drive Russia closer to China. 

The recently released joint Russia-China “pact” does more than just condemn AUKUS and express Russian support for the “one China” policy. It also shows how Russia and China share a fear of encirclement by US-led alliances — in particular, both Russia and China see AUKUS as a kind of “Asian NATO”.

The pact also carries important symbolism which was further emphasised with Putin’s warm reception at the opening ceremony of the Winter Olympics in Beijing.

But Russia will continue to avoid betting the house on its relationship with China. Russian companies will increasingly seek ways around US sanctions to sell arms and technology to emerging economies in Asia, particularly those in ASEAN who fear growing Chinese power.

Moreover, a newly created “two-plus-two” ministerial dialogue between Russia and India (a format that India follows only with Australia, Japan, and the United States) will rebuild Russia’s old relationship with India, a key Chinese rival in Asia. 

A renewed India-Russia relationship has real potential to impact the unity and functioning of the “Quad alliance” between Australia, the US, India and Japan. We saw this at last week’s Quad meeting in Melbourne where India pointedly refused to join the other three members in criticising the Russian military build-up on the Ukrainian border.

Australian policymakers must recognise the deep complexities and contradictions in Russia’s emerging role in Asia. This requires abandoning old Cold War binaries and instincts to outsource Russia policy to the US. Instead it requires careful study of Russia’s role in Asia. Only this will allow Australia to formulate effective policy that can both counter and engage with Russia’s complex role in the region.