The prime minister said yesterday that the Solomon Islands-China agreement was “no surprise to us” because “we have known for some time the risk of a deal such as this coming about”. Referring to “security matters”, he said he wouldn’t give any more details. But the Minister for International Development Zed Seselja has said that the government found out only when the public did.
The opposition has called the Solomons-China agreement the “worst failure of Australian foreign policy in the Pacific” in almost 80 years. With less hyperbole, independent Senator Rex Patrick has called it “Australia’s worst intelligence failure” in more than two decades.
There is a way to deal with a serious intelligence failure, particularly since the opposition claims to be outraged too. The government, with bipartisan support, can declassify the intelligence it received. This intelligence can be sanitised so as to conceal the specific means by which it was obtained.
Such sanitisation and concealment preserves the intelligence agency’s ability to continue to obtain intelligence on the target. For example, there is no need to reveal raw intelligence derived from communications intelligence (the preserve of the Australian Signals Directorate) or human intelligence (the preserve of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service).
The Office of National Assessments and the Defence Intelligence Organisation produce intelligence assessments that draw on raw intelligence, but the assessments are analytical reports that have been and can be sanitised so that foreign governments and other hostile elements cannot take adequate countermeasures.
That would be an easy way to examine whether the intelligence agencies gave advance warning — and if so, of what kind.
The United States, which takes oversight of intelligence agencies seriously, held an inquiry after its intelligence community failed to provide warning of India’s nuclear tests in 1998. The director of central intelligence appointed a panel of outside experts, chaired by Admiral David Jeremiah, a former vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The report remains classified, but Admiral Jeremiah provided reporters with an unclassified description of his group’s findings.
He talked about the problems in collecting information about the Indian program, as well as about analysts who refused to believe that the government would carry through on its promise to conduct nuclear tests, and discussed his recommendations.
He also responded to questions regarding the seriousness of the intelligence failure, the role of Indian security measures in preventing US detection of test plans, and whether with warning of India’s plans the US government could have taken diplomatic action to prevent the tests.
The US also released an unclassified list with specific recommendations in four different areas: analytic assumptions; collection management and tasking; manning and training; and organising and integrating the United States Intelligence Community.
Australia can do something very similar.
There are precedents for this. In 2005, the US declassified a large number of previously classified signals intelligence reports and other intelligence papers concerning the Vietnam War, specifically the Gulf of Tonkin incident. Australia’s defence minister confirmed in Parliament that the US government did not consult with the Australian government before deciding to release these materials.*
With bipartisan support, greater oversight would improve the performance of the intelligence agencies in what is a pivotal decade in Australian history.
*Brendan Nelson (Bradfield, minister for defence): Answer to question in writing, Signals Intelligence Reports, Hansard p 2810, 14 February 2006.
With bipartisan support, greater oversight would improve the performance of the intelligence agencies in what is a pivotal decade in Australian history.
What makes you think they want transparency and improve the performance of the intelligence agencies?
Its much better if you keep them in the dark and tell them what stories (fairy tales) support your policies.
or wedge your opponents.
Even more simply, and less prone to security bluster and BS, just ask the following. We are told by Scomocchio “we knew about this”. We presumably means… Well the woodchuck says we didn’t know until March. Both are referencing government but key is, does we mean minister or ministry or senior levels or just of course that someone somewhere, Signals, ONA, DFAT, noted it? A very broad we.
So the questions are, who noted it or wrote a brief on it, when? At what level and to what level? What was the response? Where did it go? How much too-ing and fro-ing went on, at what level and when? Answers to these would tell you a lot.
I have heard several times from Canberra contacts, that during the pandemic many mid level and senior bureaucrats were tearing their hair out as briefs, warnings and plans for action died for apparent want of attention on ministers’ desks. It fits what we know publicly of the laziness and incompetence of this government. True across the board apparently, so why not in foreign affairs?
Had Australia dissuaded the Solomon Islands from entering into an agreement with China, Scomo would say “I prevented this”. However, now that it is a done deal, the “we” word comes out. Blame-shifting.
the five eyes might require some laser surgery
Ecperience tells us that the LNP like their secrecy too much. There will be no declassification. Even if it kills them or even us.
It’s all a bit lilke the submarine fiasco with the French which makes Dutton’s gamble with the AUKUS subs a very stupid move seeing that they won’t be in use for years yet. Meanwhile, back at the ranch………..Thanks Cabinet!