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AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL HUMPHREYS
SWORN 1 FEBRUARY 2012

COURT DETAILS

Court Supreme Court of New South Wales
Division Equity
Registry Sydney
Case number 2011/285907

TITLE OF PROCEEDINGS

First plaintiff **Hope Rinehart Welker**
Number of plaintiffs **3**

First defendant **Gina Hope Rinehart**
Second defendant **Ginia Hope Frances Rinehart**

FILING DETAILS

Filed for **Gina Hope Rinehart, first defendant**
Legal representative Corrs Chambers Westgarth
Paul McCann / Kim Hamilton
Legal representative reference 9080776
Contact email paul.mccann@corrs.com.au / kim.hamilton@corrs.com.au

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be a stylized initial or name.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, clearly legible as "M.J. Humphreys".

AFFIDAVIT

Name Michael Humphreys
Address Level 3, 45 Clarence Street, Sydney, NSW
Occupation Managing Director, Control Risks Australia Pacific
Date 1 February 2012

I say on oath:

1. I am the Managing Director of Control Risks Australia Pacific (**Control Risks**). I have held this position since 1 April 2009.
2. I hold a Bachelor of Arts degree in Military Studies from the University of New South Wales, a Master of Science degree in Defence from the University of Madras and a Master of Business Administration Degree from Southern Cross University.
3. I also hold a New South Wales Security Industry Licence No: 409522947, Class 2 A and B Consultant.
4. I have been employed by Control Risks since 15 July 2005, initially as Practice Leader for the Crisis and Security Practice, before taking up the position on 1 January 2008 as Asia Pacific Manager for Project Management.
5. I have assisted clients dealing with crisis and security issues in Australia and offshore, and my experience includes advising companies dealing with threats from criminals and deranged people, management of executive protection teams, risk assessment for executives facing industrial disputes, security planning for companies and government and advising on kidnap avoidance.
6. Before working for Control Risks I was an officer in the in the Australian Army between 7 December 1980 and 5 May 2005, retiring as a Lieutenant Colonel.
7. In 2004 I was awarded the Conspicuous Service Cross in the Queen's Birthday Honours for my service to the United Nations Special Coordinator for Middle East peace.
8. Control Risks is a global risk consultancy specialising in helping organisations manage political, integrity and security risks in complex and hostile environments. It is my understanding that, since its inception in 1975, Control Risks has worked with more than 5,000 corporate and government clients in over 135 countries. Control Risks has 36 offices and approximately 2,000 consultants globally.



- 9. Services provided by Control Risks include country and site risk assessments, investigations, security design services and forensics. We also provide complex problem solving around political and security issues, crisis management consultancy, security management and executive protection services for events and projects.
- 10. Under my supervision and direction I caused to be prepared a Comparative Security Risk Assessment report dated 31 January 2012. Annexed hereto and marked "A" is a copy of that report.

SWORN at Sydney

Signature of deponent

Signature of witness



Name of witness Paul McCann

Address of witness 1 Farrer Place, Sydney

Capacity of witness Lawyer

Note: The deponent and witness must sign each page of the affidavit. See UCPR 35.7B.

Report

This is the Annexure marked " *A* " referred to in the Affidavit of *MICHAEL HUMPHREYS* sworn before me the *1st* day of *FEBRUARY 2012*

.....
~~A Justice of the Peace/Solicitor~~

Corrs Chambers Westgarth Lawyers

GPO Box 9925
SYDNEY 2001

Project Tara – Comparative Security Risk Assessment

Task no: 00067805

31 January 2012

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Documents are for the benefit of the client only and may not be disclosed to any third parties without the prior written consent of Control Risks; such consent not to be withheld unreasonably.

Control Risks' standard terms of business for the relevant service apply – as attached or otherwise available on request. 6/09

Executive summary

This report uses the framework of International Standards Organisation (ISO) 31000 to make comparative assessments of security risks to Mrs Gina Rinehart and her family members while a media suppression order is in place prohibiting media reporting on the matter relating to control of Hope Margaret Hancock Trust ('the Trust') with the possible situation where the suppression order is removed.

Control Risks' experience over 40 years of assisting clients to manage security risk is that public and media profile is a key factor in exposure to risk. Reducing profile is a key protective security recommendation adopted by individuals, business and governments to protect against criminals, terrorists and issue motivated groups.

A high media profile or sensational reporting alerts organised and petty criminals, psychologically unstable individuals and issue motivated groups to the existence of potential victims. Media reporting of wealth and relationship issues, particularly when families are involved, assists in the motivation of threat groups by giving psychological justification for criminal actions. Reporting also assists criminals by providing practical information regarding identification, location and habits of victims. Social media and the trend for mainstream journalists to cultivate citizen journalists and use crowd sourcing provides the media with powerful information collection capabilities that may raise profiles to the detriment of victims.

Control Risks assesses that the Rinehart family currently have relatively low public and media profiles, particularly the children and grandchildren living in Thailand, the US, UK and Canada. Lifting the suppression order on the current matter risks exposing the children and grandchildren to serious security risks. Our comparative threat assessment found that lifting the suppression order is likely to:

- Increase threats to Mrs Gina Rinehart from criminals, deranged individuals and issue motivated groups in Australia. Her travel security threat levels are also negatively impacted.
- Significantly increase threats to Mr John Hancock and his children in Thailand from organised crime
- Significantly increase threats to Ms Bianca Rinehart and her family in Vancouver from issue motivated groups and organised, criminals, deranged persons and issue motivated groups
- Significantly increase threats to Ms Hope Welker Rinehart and her family in New York from organised and petty criminals, deranged personnel and issue motivated groups
- Increase the threat to Ms Ginia Rinehart in the UK from organised and petty criminals, issue motivated groups and deranged personnel.

In addition to considering threat sources Control Risks also analysed risk levels of various activities undertaken by the Rinehart family with the suppression order in place and hypothetically removed. Our findings indicate that risk levels increase as follows:

- For Mrs Gina Rinehart, residential, workplace harassment and travel risks were increased
- For Mr Hancock and his children, abduction and kidnap for ransom risks increased as well as travel risks
- For Ms Bianca Rinehart, Ms Hope Welker Rinehart and Ms Ginia Rinehart, robbery, protest, harassment, abduction and kidnap risks all increased as well as travel risks.

This report contains a number of cases studies where media profiles have been a factor in attracting high risk or actual threats. Examples include the family of the UK's former football captain, David Beckham, whose wife and children have been the subject of two kidnap plots and a death threat in the past decade. The cases of US comedian David Letterman who suffered a kidnap attempt and Joss Stone a UK singer who suffered serious security threats also illustrate the point. Australian examples include the murder of Doctor Victor Chang in Sydney during a failed kidnap attempt on this family after a newspaper had described him as being 'filthy rich' and the more recent case of a series of death threats against the politician Tony Windsor after a series of media articles regarding his support for labour party projects. More recently the extortion attempt against the parents of Madeline Pulver, an Australian schoolgirl, demonstrates the links between wealth publicity and crime. Finally, the case of El Gato, a Mexican footballer, who used his celebrity status to seek information about wealthy families in order to assist drug cartels with kidnap for ransom activities demonstrates the lengths that threat groups may go to in order to carry out crimes.

Introduction

This report compares security risk levels for members of the Rinehart family while a media suppression order is in place prohibiting media reporting on the matter relating to control of Hope Margaret Hancock Trust ('the Trust') with the possible situation where the suppression order is removed. It is understood that proceedings relating to the Trust commenced on 5 September 2011 in the Supreme Court of New South Wales and the suppression order came into effect at the same time.

Consideration was given to the following Rinehart family members:

- Mrs Gina Rinehart, resident in Perth, Western Australia, but a frequent traveller throughout the world.
- Her children, resident as follows:
 - Mr John Hancock – Koh Samui, Thailand, with his two young children
 - Ms Bianca Rinehart – Vancouver, Canada, with her young child
 - Ms Hope Welker Rinehart – New York, US, with her two young children
 - Ms Ginia Rinehart – London, UK.

In order to develop a comparative risk assessment Control Risks has used the framework of the International Standards Organisation (ISO) 31000 approach combined with our experience of dealing with security risk globally for over 40 years. Phases included:

- Consideration of current and projected media profiles should the suppression order be lifted
- Threats and vulnerabilities in each location
- Risk levels
- Potential risk militating measures.

Key security factors in the Rinehart family case

Media profile A key risk factor in security is a potential victim's media profile. Media articles alert criminals, deranged persons and other threat groups to wealth, habits and locations. Media articles also motivate threat groups by providing emotional or psychological justification for attacks. Control Risks has summarized a number of case studies illustrating this point at the end of the document.

Current media profile

Mrs Rinehart currently has a relatively low media profile in Australia and an even lower profile globally. She does not actively seek publicity or court controversy. Media searches reveal articles on her business dealings, philanthropy and alleged wealth. There are also reports on earlier legal proceedings regarding the estate of her late father and speculation in Western Australian publications in September and October 2011 around the current matter. Her four children have even lower profiles and, prior to September 2011, were relatively unknown outside Perth with little national or global profiles.

Control Risks assesses that it would be difficult for threat groups, such as criminals or deranged individuals, to find the full range of motivation or practical crime support information, such as travel schedules, from the current media profiles of Mrs Rinehart and her children. Of concern however is the

publication on 20 January 2012 of an article and photos in the Weekend West which has included photos of all four children. Wider and more frequent publication is likely to lead to higher security threats.

Potential public profile

Should the suppression order be lifted it is likely that the Rinehart case will be widely reported by Western Australian, national and global media. It is also likely to be widely discussed in social media and on blog sites. Social media is likely to rapidly amplify and sensationalise issues. The nature of reporting is likely to be personal rather than business in nature. The case has the potential to attract on-going sensationalist and attention seeking headlines. The combination of wealth, youth and acrimony is likely to sustain media interest and significantly raise the profile of Mrs Rinehart's children in their local jurisdictions and when travelling.

A feature of media reporting that has rapidly emerged in past few years is 'crowd sourcing' by 'citizen journalists'. 'Crowd sourcing' is where individuals using mobile phones pursue reports on incidents and the activities of other individuals by feeding real time information to social media sites such as Facebook, YouTube and MySpace. People with high media profiles are particularly vulnerable to this type of reporting and for them it has security implications because their movements and activities can be tracked by members of the public and criminals. It is likely that media interest in the Rinehart family case will lead to wide public recognition of Rinehart family members in the UK, North America and Thailand. This will impact on their privacy and personal security.

Context

The key components of context in this case are threat and vulnerability.

Threat summary

Control Risks has identified the following general threat categories faced by members of the Rinehart family:

- Organised crime
- Petty criminals
- Deranged persons
- Maleficent employees or business partners
- Competitors
- Issue motivated groups
- Foreign governments
- Terrorists.

In each case threats are rated in accordance with the definitions in the table below.

Threat level	Definition
Very High	There is a very strong possibility that the source will carry out an event with the potential for impact on assets.
High	There is a significant possibility that the source will carry out an event with the potential for impact on assets.
Medium	There is a moderate possibility that the source will carry out an event with the potential for impact on assets.
Low	It is unlikely that the source will carry out an event with the potential for impact on assets.
Very Low	It is highly unlikely that the source will carry out an event with the potential for impact on assets.
Not Applicable	Threat is not applicable to project – no threat sources identified with capability and/or intent.
Out of Scope	Out of scope – threat has not been assessed.

Each threat category was analysed in terms of capability, intention to act, and opportunity for each member of the Rinehart family in their current locations under circumstances where the suppression order was in place and if it were lifted. The details results of the threat assessment are shown at Annex A; comparative threat summaries are shown below.

Threat summary Mrs Gina Rinehart

Lifestyle considerations

Mrs Rinehart is a prominent business leader residing in Perth. It is understood that she travels frequently to other Australian cities, remote mine sites run by her business and to offshore locations. Offshore locations include Europe, the United States, Singapore, China and Korea. Mrs Rinehart also has business interests in India and philanthropic interests in Cambodia where she supports SISHA an anti-human trafficking and exploitation organisation. She has business arrangements with Korean, Indian and many Chinese entities are her end customers.

It is also understood that Mrs Rinehart now employs the services of a body guard for many of her journeys.

Her status as a wealthy person in Australia is unlikely to attract the attention of organised crime who tend to avoid committing crimes against high profile people in order to keep their own profile low with law enforcement authorities. Organised crime in offshore jurisdictions tends to be less discriminating giving her a higher threat profile. The almost certain increase in lifting of media profile will increase threats from petty criminals in Australia and offshore to high levels.

Mrs Gina Rinehart – threat summary							
With suppression order in place							
Organised crime	Petty crime	Deranged persons	Maleficent employees	Competitors	Issue motivated groups	Foreign governments	Terrorists
Low	Medium	Medium	Low	Low	Medium	Low	Very low
With suppression order lifted							
Organised crime	Petty crime	Deranged persons	Maleficent employees	Competitors	Issue motivated groups	Foreign governments	Terrorists
Low (Australia)	High	High	Medium	Low	Medium	Low	Very low
Medium (offshore)							

Threat summary Mr John Hancock

John Hancock's long term residency in Thailand combined with higher media profile caused by lifting of the suppression order raises his threat level to high for organised criminals and petty criminals. It is considered that his children would be particularly vulnerable.

Mr John Hancock and two young children in Thailand – threat summary							
With suppression order in place							
Organised crime	Petty crime	Deranged persons	Maleficent employees	Competitors	Issue motivated groups	Foreign governments	Terrorists
Medium	Medium	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Very low
With suppression order lifted							
Organised crime	Petty crime	Deranged persons	Maleficent employees	Competitors	Issue motivated groups	Foreign governments	Terrorists
High	High	Medium	Low	Low	Low	Low	Very low

Threat summary Bianca Rinehart, Hope Rinehart Welker, Ginia Rinehart and children

Lifestyle considerations give current threat levels a medium rating but worldwide media profiling once the suppression order is lifted are likely to bring them all to the interest of organised crime and petty criminals in particular. In the current climate issue motivated groups are also likely to threaten.

Ms Bianca Rinehart with one young child in Vancouver, Canada– threat summary							
With suppression order in place							
Organised crime	Petty crime	Deranged persons	Maleficent employees	Competitors	Issue motivated groups	Foreign governments	Terrorists
Low	Medium	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Very low
With suppression order lifted							
Organised crime	Petty crime	Deranged persons	Maleficent employees	Competitors	Issue motivated groups	Foreign governments	Terrorists
Medium	High	Medium	Medium	Low	Medium	Low	Very low

Ms Hope Welker Rinehart including two young children in New York, US– threat summary							
With suppression order in place							
Organised crime	Petty crime	Deranged persons	Maleficent employees	Competitors	Issue motivated groups	Foreign governments	Terrorists
Low	Medium	Low	Low	Low	Low	Very Low	Low
With suppression order lifted							
Organised crime	Petty crime	Deranged persons	Maleficent employees	Competitors	Issue motivated groups	Foreign governments	Terrorists
Medium	High	Medium	Medium	Low	Medium	Very Low	Low

Ms Ginia Rinehart in London, UK – threat summary							
With suppression order in place							
Organised crime	Petty crime	Deranged persons	Maleficent employees	Competitors	Issue motivated groups	Foreign governments	Terrorists
Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Very Low	Low
With suppression order lifted							
Organised crime	Petty crime	Deranged persons	Maleficent employees	Competitors	Issue motivated groups	Foreign governments	Terrorists
Medium	High	Medium	Medium	Low	Medium	Very Low	Low

It is Control Risks assessment that overall threat levels increase for all members of the Rinehart family after the suppression order is lifted. This is particularly so for John Hancock in Thailand, whom we assess would face high threats from organised and petty criminals as a result of a higher media profile. The three female members of the family would also face increased threats with some levels going from low to medium.

Vulnerability review

The vulnerability review consisted of consideration of each target's attractiveness relative to similar targets in any given location and pre and post event control measures such as provision of physical, electronic and organisational security measures.

Factors affecting are the attractiveness of a target to criminals are: comfort fit, accessibility, recuperability, visibility, effect and recognisability.

Comfort fit

Comfort fit refers to the threat source's knowledge and experience of the victim. In the case of the Rinehart family, Control Risks assesses that Mrs Rinehart's situation provides the least comfort fit for most potential adversaries in Australia because of her relatively limited public appearances and stature within the community. . There are clearly targets of greater comfort fit for most adversary groups, with the possible exception of issue motivated groups. Her profile would be of greater comfort fit for off shore criminals particularly in jurisdictions where law enforcement is less effective. It is possible that an increased media profile via sensationalist reporting may make her a greater comfort fit for individuals suffering psychological disorders. Mrs Rinehart's children would present a greater comfort fit for organised and petty criminals, particularly in South-east Asia and possibly for some groups in the US or UK.

Accessibility

Accessibility refers to proximity to the threat source and ease of access. Mrs Rinehart's location in Australia makes her relatively inaccessible to most threat groups. Her offshore travel will make her more accessible particularly in jurisdictions with weak law enforcement such as India or Cambodia. . Her children are accessible to a wider range of threat groups because of their locations in heavily populated locations with significant criminal densities.

Recuperability

Recuperability refers to the victim's capabilities to retaliate and recover. Mrs Rinehart's status as a leading business figure leads to a perception of power and ability to influence authorities to act. This detracts from her attractiveness as a target. Recuperability diminishes when she travels off shore however. Her children are likely to be perceived to have less influence in the jurisdictions in which they reside and recuperability is unlikely to be a deterrent.

Visibility

Visibility refers to image, third-party association, reputation, media profile and status. Control Risks does not have complete access to relevant information in this case. It is assessed that, should the suppression order be lifted, likely sensationalist reporting will negatively impact on the security risks situation for all members of the Rinehart family but particularly those offshore.

Effect

Effect refers to the threat group's ability to achieve their desired goals by attacking the Rinehart family members relative to others. Threat groups will also consider whether their actions will alienate other stakeholders. It is assessed that certain offshore organised crime groups, particularly those prone to kidnap for ransom or extortion, may be attracted to the effects of operating against the Rinehart children.

Recognisability

This factor refers to recognisability as a target. Higher media profile clearly increases recognisability and therefore vulnerability. This is particularly an issue for Mrs Rinehart's children who have previously had a low media profile.

Effectiveness of pre and post control measures

Control measures against security threats can be physical (such as locks, bars and barriers, electronic such as close circuit TV, or access control systems) or organisational (such as security management, guarding and response options). The aim of control measures is to **deter, detect, delay and deny** threat groups. Review of existing control measures for each family member is beyond the scope of this report; however, it is assumed that each member has some measures in place. Control Risks assesses that each family member will require enhanced security measures to be put in place should the suppression order be lifted. Enhanced security measures may include executive protection, surveillance, enhanced electronic security and restrictions on movement.

Most security reviews recommend lowering of one's profile as a key protective control measure. Lifting of the suppression order is likely to take this measure out of consideration.

Comparative risk assessment

Risk assessment consists of three steps as follows:

Identification	The interaction of a threat and human activity produces a risk. For example a Rinehart family member attending a public function produces a range of risks from nuisance heckling through to assault. Occupying a residence produces a risk of burglary. Domestic or overseas travel produces a risk of kidnap.
Analysis	Analysis provides an understanding of the risk including current levels of exposure. In this case we consider the attractiveness of the target to the threat group. For example the attractiveness of kidnapping a member of the family for ransom demands. The attractiveness of harassing younger female members of the family by gangs.
Evaluation	Calculates a comparative risk level by considering likelihood of the risk occurring and the impact or consequence. An example would be the likelihood of kidnap in Thailand by organised crime gangs is low but the impact is high making the overall risk level high.

A more detailed explanation of risk assessment is included at Annex C.

Summary of comparative risk levels

Risk categories derived for the Rinehart family are:

- Residential
 - Robbery
 - Assault/murder
 - Protest, blockade, denial of access
 - Harassment
- Travel risk
 - Robbery
 - Assault
 - Abduction, kidnap
 - Harassment
- Workplace risk
 - Robbery
 - Assault/murder

▫ Harassment

Each family member's situation was analysed in relation to the likelihood and effect of each risk category with the suppression order in place and with it removed. The results were as follows:

- Mrs Gina Rinehart – increased risks for residential, workplace harassment and travel
- Mr John Hancock – increased risk for abduction and kidnap for ransom and travel
- Ms Bianca Rinehart – increased risk for robbery, protest, harassment, abduction and kidnap and travel
- Ms Hope Welker Rinehart – increased risk for robbery, protest, harassment, abduction and kidnap and travel
- Ms Ginia Rinehart – increased risk for robbery, protest, harassment, abduction and kidnap and travel

Case examples where increased media reporting has led to security threats

Case study 1: The Beckham family

Background information

The Beckham family, comprising soccer player David Beckham ('David'), singer Victoria Beckham ('Victoria') and their four children (collectively 'the Beckham family'), have received extensive media coverage globally. As individuals, David and Victoria have been high-profile celebrities for almost two decades, and as a couple their relationship has received substantial attention, including frequent mentions of their financial position.

With an estimated combined wealth of GBP 125 million in 2009, the Beckham family was recorded by UK publication the *Sunday Times* as the 426th richest people in the UK.¹

Threats and security incidents

The Beckham family members have been exposed to security threats directly as a result of their celebrity. Over the years they have received a number of death threats, in addition to the attention of stalkers.² Three security threats stand out as particularly high profile and have been briefly outlined below.

January 2000 kidnapping plot

In January 2000 detectives from Scotland Yard informed the Beckham family that they had uncovered a plot to kidnap Victoria and her oldest son.³ In this instance, it was reported that an initial kidnapping attempt was to be made in November 1999 while David was playing soccer against Scotland.⁴ No arrests were made in this particular instance; however, the threat was considered credible enough that police reportedly moved the Beckham family to a secret location for a brief period of time.⁵

March 2000 death threats

In March 2000 Victoria was the subject of a death threat while preparing to perform as part of the Spice Girls at the Brit Awards ceremony.⁶ This threat was reportedly delivered to the home of her parents two days before the scheduled performance.⁷ Subsequently, during a rehearsal, Victoria was observed to have a red laser pointed at her chest and she was immediately removed from the stage.⁸ Subsequent investigations revealed that a fire door was wedged open and concerns were raised that a potential assassin had been present at the rehearsal venue.⁹ It does not appear that any arrests were made in relation to this incident.

November 2002 kidnapping plot

In November 2002 the Beckham family were informed of a kidnapping plot reportedly involving a group of Albanian and Romanian nationals in the UK.¹⁰ Originally uncovered by investigative reporters from

¹ "Ten years of brand Beckham", *BBC*, 3 July 2009

² "Beckhams shocked by kidnap bid", *The Scotsman*, 4 November 2002

³ "Baby Becks kidnap bid foiled by top cop squad", *Sunday Mercury*, 9 January 2000

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ "Victoria Beckham", *London Evening Standard*, 2011

⁶ "Five are held in Beckham kidnap plot", *The Telegraph*, 3 November 2002

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ "Posh 'kidnap' men cleared", *London Evening Standard*, 2 June 2003

The News of the World, the group reportedly intended to kidnap Victoria and hold her for a ransom of GBP 5 million.¹¹ This plot reportedly revolved around the use of a "chemical spray" to sedate Victoria, and to kidnap her children if they were with her.¹² The investigation was handed over to the police and led to the arrest of six people.¹³ Control Risks notes that the case was dismissed at court when it was revealed that the primary informant in the case was a convicted criminal who had received payment from *The News of the World*.¹⁴

Case study 2: Joss Stone

Background information

Joss Stone ('Stone') is an English singer who rose to fame after the release of her 2003 album: *The Soul Sessions*.¹⁵ Stone is reportedly a close friend of His Royal Highness Prince William, the Duke of Cambridge, and her fans include Barack Obama, the US President.¹⁶ As a result of her rise to fame, and comparisons of Stone's music to that of soul singer Aretha Franklin, she has received extensive media coverage in the world press.¹⁷

Threats and security incidents

In June 2011 two men were arrested in the UK over a plot to kidnap, rob and kill Stone.¹⁸ At the time of their arrest they were observed to be driving around Stone's neighbourhood, and were in possession of aerial photographs and maps of her house.¹⁹ In addition, they reportedly had weapons, rope and a body bag, along with a note stating that they should "find a river to dump her in".²⁰

It has been indicated that, in this instance, the motivation for the plot was financial. Stone is believed to have a personal fortune in the vicinity of GBP 9 million.²¹

Case study 3: David Letterman

Background information

David Letterman ('Letterman') is an American comedian and television presenter. He has been on late-night television in the US since 1982, originally on *Late Night with David Letterman*, and has been the host of the *Late Show with David Letterman* since 1993.²² By 1995 Letterman was the most watched and highest paid late night television talk show host in America.²³

Threats and security incidents

As a high-profile celebrity and comedian in America, Letterman has been the subject of a number of threats and security incidents in the course of his career. Three examples have been outlined below.

¹¹ "Paper defends 'kidnap' coverage", *BBC*, 3 June 2003.

¹² "Beckhams shocked by kidnap bid", *op. cit.*

¹³ "Beckham 'kidnap' case collapses", *BBC*, 2 June 2003

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ "Joss Stone: the 'white Aretha Franklin' of soul", *The Telegraph*, 15 June 2011

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ "Is Joss Stone the new Aretha Franklin?", *The Guardian*, 14 November 2003

¹⁸ "Two charged on Joss Stone GBH and robbery plot", *The Sun*, 16 June 2011

¹⁹ "Men arrested over Joss Stone kidnap plot", *ninemsn*, 15 June 2011

²⁰ "Joss Stone 'kidnap' plotters' note reads: 'Find a river to dump her in'", *NME*, 17 June 2011

²¹ "Man in court over Joss Stone 'kidnap plot'", *The Telegraph*, 24 October 2011

²² CBS, http://www.cbs.com/late_night/late_show/bio/david_letterman/bio.php

²³ The Museum of Broadcast Communications, <http://www.museum.tv/eotvsection.php?entrycode=lettermanda>

Kidnapping plot

In March 2005 Kelly Frank ('Frank'), who had been employed as a painter at Letterman's ranch in Montana, was arrested and charged for plotting to kidnap Letterman's infant son and the child's nanny.²⁴ According to media reports, Frank intended to seek a USD 5 million ransom from Letterman in return for their release.²⁵ Kidnapping charges against Frank were eventually dropped by prosecutors, although he was convicted in relation to other offences against Letterman, including theft and obstruction.²⁶

Extortion attempts

In 2009 Letterman was the victim of extortion attempts by an employee of the news program *48 Hours*.²⁷ Robert Joe Halderman ('Halderman'), a producer for *48 Hours*, attempted to obtain USD 2 million from Letterman, stating that if he didn't pay him, Halderman would reveal that Letterman had engaged in sexual relationships with female employees.²⁸ Letterman approached authorities and met with Halderman, passing him a false cheque for USD 2 million during the course of the incident.²⁹ In 2010, Halderman plead guilty to the extortion attempt and was imprisoned for six months.³⁰

Internet death threat

In August 2011 a militant Islamist made a post on an internet forum reportedly frequented by associates of al Qaeda.³¹ In this post he prevailed upon the Muslim community of America to kill Letterman, as a result of comments that Letterman had made after the death of senior al Qaeda members Osama bin Laden and Ilyas Kashmiri.³² The matter was referred to the New York Police Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and it is likely that this investigation is ongoing.³³

Case study 4: 'El Gato'

Background information

Omar Ortiz, also known as 'El Gato' or 'the Cat' ('Ortiz'), was a Mexican football goalkeeper. He played football for Club de Futbol Monterrey in Mexico, debuting in 1997.³⁴ Ortiz was banned from football in 2010 as a result of testing positive for steroids.³⁵

Arrest

In early January 2012 it was reported that Ortiz may have been kidnapped from his home in Nuevo Leon on 4 January 2012.³⁶ It was subsequently revealed that he had not been kidnapped, but had been arrested by Mexican authorities.³⁷ Ortiz was accused of being a member of a group of kidnapers associated with the Mexican Gulf Cartel, responsible for using his celebrity status and connections to

²⁴ "Montana man charged with Letterman plot", *CNN*, 17 March 2005

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ America's Most Wanted, <http://www.amw.com/fugitives/case.cfm?id=45750>

²⁷ "David Letterman on extortion attempt: 'I felt menaced by this'", *Los Angeles Times*, 2 October 2009

²⁸ "Robert Halderman, 48 Hours producer, named in David Letterman sex extortion plot", *CBS News*, 2 October 2009

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ "Ex-CBS producer Robert Halderman pleads guilty to blackmailing David Letterman over intern affairs", *New York Daily News*, 9 March 2010

³¹ "David Letterman targeted with threat from Jihadist website", *MTV*, 18 August 2011

³² "Letterman threat on Al Qaeda website is no laughing matter", *Christian Science Monitor*, 18 August 2011

³³ "David Letterman targeted with threat from Jihadist website", *op .cit.*

³⁴ Goal, <http://www.goal.com/en-sg/news/3865/test-section/2012/01/07/2834247/kidnap-fears-grow-for-former-jaguaires-and-monterrey>

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ Goal, <http://www.goal.com/en/news/1937/america/2012/01/06/2834205/kidnap-fears-grow-for-former-jaguaires-and-monterrey>

assist in the selection of wealthy kidnapping victims.³⁸ Ortiz has reportedly confessed to involvement with the kidnapping group, with ransom demands of USD 72,000 made for each victim.³⁹

The gang with which Ortiz was involved has reportedly been involved in the kidnapping of 20 people.⁴⁰ One victim of the gang was identified as Armando Gomez ('Gomez'), the husband of Mexican pop singer Gloria Trevi ('Trevi'), who has been identified as the "supreme diva of Mexican pop".⁴¹ It appears that Trevi had not previously commented on the kidnapping of Gomez, but he was kidnapped in October 2011.⁴²

Case study 5: The Pulver family

Background information

The Pulver family, comprising businessman William Pulver ('William'), landscape gardener Belinda Pulver ('Belinda') and their three children (collectively 'the Pulver family'), has recently received extensive media coverage in Australia due to a 2011 extortion plot against them. Although they had not previously received extensive media coverage in Australia, the Pulver family was reputedly well known and connected in Sydney society, with William involved in the media and marketing sectors.⁴³

William is the chief executive officer of Appen Butler Hill, a company that specialises in linguistic solutions.⁴⁴ In 2011, William completed the merger of his own company, Appen Pty Ltd, with the Butler Hill Group, establishing the new group as a pinnacle group in contemporary language technology.⁴⁵

Threats and security incidents

On 3 August 2011 a masked man, alleged to be Paul Douglas Peters ('Peters'), entered the Pulver family home in Mosman. Inside the home, he encountered Madeleine Pulver ('Madeleine'), William and Belinda's oldest daughter. The man proceeded to attach a collar-like device around Madeleine's neck, informing her that it was a bomb and that she was to follow his instructions.⁴⁶ After ten hours, police managed to remove the device from Madeleine and discovered that it was not an explosive device.⁴⁷ A subsequent investigation led police to arrest Peters in the US, alleging that he was responsible for the incident.⁴⁸

In this case, it has been alleged that Peters was previously employed by a company with links to the Pulver family.⁴⁹

Case Study 6: Victor Chang

Background information

Victor Chang ('Chang'), was an Australian cardiac surgeon who was one of the pioneers of contemporary heart transplant surgery. In 1986 Chang was appointed as a Companion of the Order of Australia, and the University of New South Wales awarded him the highest available degree, the M.D.

³⁸ "Omar Ortiz: Mexican soccer goalie arrested for alleged role in kidnapping of pop star Gloria Trevi's husband", *The Huffington Post*, 8 January 2012

³⁹ "Mexico footballer Omar Ortiz arrested over kidnap ring", *BBC*, 8 January 2012

⁴⁰ "Mexican soccer star arrested for working in kidnapping ring that took pop singer's husband", *The Daily Mail*, 9 January 2012

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ "Who are the Pulvers? Wealthy members of elite society targeted", *The Daily Telegraph*, 4 August 2011

⁴⁴ Appen Butler Hill, Leadership, <http://www.appenbutlerhill.com/leadership>

⁴⁵ Appen Butler Hill, Company, <http://www.appenbutlerhill.com/company>

⁴⁶ "Sydney teenager in 10-hour bomb hoax ordeal", *The Guardian*, 4 August 2011

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ "The latest developments in the Madeleine Pulver collar bomb hoax case", *The Daily Telegraph*, 16 August 2011

⁴⁹ "Bomb collar suspect to fight charges", *ABC*, 17 August 2011

Honoris Causa, for "scholarly achievement and humanitarian endeavour".⁵⁰ Chang developed Australia's National Heart Transplant Program, which has performed over 1200 heart, heart-lung and single lung transplants since it was established in 1984.⁵¹

Threats and security incidents

On 4 July 1991 Chang was shot and killed during a failed extortion attempt.⁵² While driving in Mosman, Chang's car was rammed by a vehicle containing two Malaysian men, Chew Seng Liew ('Liew') and Choon Tee Lim ('Lim').⁵³ When Chang emerged from his vehicle, the two men demanded that he get into their car.⁵⁴ Chang refused, and Liew reportedly panicked, firing on Chang and killing him.⁵⁵ The two men and an associate, Stanley Ng ('Ng'), originally had planned to abduct Chang earlier.⁵⁶ Their intention was to detain him, his wife and Chang's children at their home in Clontarf, and then threaten to hang members of his family unless he withdrew AUD 3 million for them.⁵⁷ Liew and Lim were charged with Chang's murder, whilst Ng was granted immunity in exchange for his evidence.⁵⁸

It was revealed that Liew, Lim and Ng had conceived of their plan after reading a magazine profiling Chinese businessmen who were "filthy rich".⁵⁹ As a result of the murder, Liew was sentenced to a maximum 26 years in prison, and Lim was sentenced to a maximum 24 years.⁶⁰

⁵⁰ Victor Chang Cardiac Research Institute, <http://www.victorchang.edu.au/public/DrVictorChang.cfm?cid=59>

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² "Victor Chang street name suggested", *The Mosman Daily*, 10 December 2009

⁵³ "Extortion the price of wealth", *The Australian*, 5 August 2010

⁵⁴ "Chang killer refused parole", *The Manly Daily*, 21 November 2009

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ "Victor Chang's killer awaits deportation", *The Australian*, 2 March 2010

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ "Two Malaysians jailed for killing heart surgeon", *New Strait Times*, 23 December 1992

⁵⁹ "Chang killer walks after 18 years in jail", *The Australian*, 27 October 2009

⁶⁰ "Victor Chang's killer awaits deportation", op. cit.

Case Study 7: Tony Windsor

Background information

Tony Windsor ('Windsor') is an Australian politician, the independent Federal Member for New England in the Parliament of Australia.⁶¹ Windsor has a background in farming and, prior to entering politics, he worked for a number of organisations and committees with a focus on the agricultural sector and land management.⁶² Windsor was previously the independent Member for Tamworth in the Parliament of New South Wales between 1991 and 2001.⁶³

Threats and security incidents

Windsor rose to prominence and began receiving extensive media coverage in Australia following the 2010 federal election. This was due to the fact that Windsor was one of the four independent candidates elected to the Parliament of Australia during the course of the election, and these independents held the balance of power.⁶⁴ During the course of 2011 it was announced that Windsor had begun to receive death threats, which he indicated were as a result of the political behaviour of opposition leader Tony Abbot ('Abbot') since his election in 2010.⁶⁵ In March 2011 Windsor indicated that he had been receiving death threats as a result of his support for the Australian Labor Party climate change framework.⁶⁶

In this instance, Windsor identified one of the causes of increased vitriol towards him as being a campaign by Abbot, and amplified by the Australian media, to conduct a "people's revolt" against plans for a carbon tax.⁶⁷

⁶¹ Tony Windsor MP, <http://www.tonywindsor.com.au/abouttw.html>

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Parliament of Australia, <http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/bn/pol/HungParliaments.htm>

⁶⁴ "Trio joins forces as Gillard claims right to govern", *The Age*, 23 August 2010

⁶⁵ "Gillard's insurance policy", *Sydney Morning Herald*, 17 September 2011

⁶⁶ "Tony Windsor death threats un-Australian, Julia Gillard says", *The Australian*, 2 March 2011

⁶⁷ Ibid.

Annex A – Comparative threat assessment

Mrs Gina Rinehart

Suppression Order in Place

Potential adversary	Capability	Intention to act	Opportunity	Remarks	Threat level
Organised criminals	Extortion, kidnap, fraud, drug crimes, trafficking, murder	Unlikely	Financial extortion through intimidation of employees, attack on routine journeys after planning and surveillance	With minor exception organised crime has avoided wealthy individuals in Australia.	Low
Petty criminals	Assault, robbery, burglary, deprivation of liberty	Possible	Incidental recognition during transit or audacious attempts steal	Travel, particularly offshore travel increases exposure to petty criminals	Medium
Deranged persons	Murder, assault, deprivation of liberty, threatening behaviour	Possible	Public record search, surveillance, incidental recognition	Emotional motivation. May be opportunistic or planned.	Medium
Employees/business partners	Fraud, information theft	Unlikely	Transfer information to external adversaries or fraud	Loyal employees may act under duress	Low
Competitors	Reputational slander, information theft	Possible	Use of third parties, public record/media search	Increasing global trend	Low
Issue motivated groups	Block movement, reputational slander, denial of access, cyber attacks	Possible	Public record/media search, surveillance, occupation/protest/high-profile stunts	An increasing global trend to target governments and wealthy individuals	Medium
Foreign governments	Information theft, exploitation	Possible	Cyberattack, phone taps	Commercially motivated	Low
Terrorists	Kidnap, murder, extortion	Unlikely	Bombing, assassination	No history of targeting individuals in Australia	Very low

Threat assessment – Mrs Gina Rinehart

Suppression Lifted

Potential adversary	Capability	Intention to act	Opportunity	Remarks	Threat level
Organised criminals	Extortion, kidnap, fraud, drug crimes, trafficking, murder	Unlikely	Financial extortion through intimidation of employees, attack on routine journeys after planning and surveillance	With minor exception organised crime has avoided wealthy individuals in Australia. Increased profile raises profile when travelling offshore	Low in Australia
					Medium when offshore
Petty criminals	Assault, robbery, burglary, deprivation of liberty	Possible	Incidental recognition during transit in Australia and offshore. Serious risk if schedule information becomes available.	Higher media profiling will lead to increased recognition factor nationally and globally.	High
Deranged persons	Murder, assault, deprivation of liberty, threatening behaviour	Possible	Public record search, surveillance, incidental recognition	Emotional motivation fed by sensational media reporting. May be opportunistic or planned.	High
Employees/business partners	Fraud, information theft	Unlikely	Transfer information to external adversaries or fraud	Loyal employees may act under duress	Medium
Competitors	Reputational slander, information theft	Possible	Use of third parties, public record/media search	Increasing global trend	Medium
Issue motivated groups	Block movement, reputational slander, denial of access, cyber attacks	Possible	Public record/media search, surveillance, occupation/protest/high-profile stunts	An increasing global trend to target governments and wealthy individuals	Medium
Foreign governments	Information theft, exploitation	Possible	Cyber attack, phone taps	Commercially motivated	Low
Terrorists	Kidnap, murder, extortion	Unlikely	Bombing, assassination	No history of targeting individuals in Australia	Very low

Threat assessment – Mr John Hancock, Koh Samui, Thailand, including two young children

Suppression Order in Place

Potential adversary	Capability	Intention to act	Opportunity	Remarks	Threat level
Organised criminals	Extortion, kidnap, fraud, drug crimes, trafficking, murder	Unlikely	Financial extortion through intimidation of employees, attack on routine journeys after planning and surveillance	Organised criminals operating in Thailand include Russian mafia.	Low
Petty criminals	Assault, robbery, burglary, deprivation of liberty	Possible	Incidental recognition during transit	Long term presence adds to exposure.	Medium
Deranged persons	Murder, assault, deprivation of liberty, threatening behaviour	Unlikely	Public record search, surveillance, incidental recognition	Emotional motivation. May be opportunistic or planned.	Low
Employees/business partners	Fraud, information theft	Unlikely	Transfer information to external adversaries or fraud	Loyal employees may act under duress	Low
Competitors	Reputational slander, information theft	Likely	Use of third parties, public record/media search	Increasing global trend	Low
Issue motivated groups	Block movement, reputational slander, denial of access, cyber attacks	Rare	Public record/media search, surveillance, occupation/protest/high-profile stunts	Unlikely in Thailand	Low
Foreign governments	Information theft, exploitation	Rare	cyber attack, phone taps	Commercially motivated	Low
Terrorists	Kidnap, murder, extortion	Unlikely	Bombing, assassination	No history of targeting foreigners in Thailand	Very low

Threat assessment – Mr John Hancock, Koh Samui, Thailand, including two young children

Suppression Order Lifted

Potential adversary	Capability	Intention to act	Opportunity	Remarks	Threat level
Organised criminals	Extortion, kidnap, fraud, drug crimes, trafficking, murder	Possible	Financial extortion through intimidation of employees, attack on routine journeys after planning and surveillance	High heightened recognition of wealth through sensational media reporting likely to make he and his family of interest to threat groups.	High
Petty criminals	Assault, robbery, burglary, y, kidnap	Possible	Incidental recognition during transit	Long term presence and heightened recognition.	High
Deranged persons	Murder, assault, deprivation of liberty, threatening behaviour	Possible	Public record search, surveillance, incidental recognition	Emotional motivation. May be opportunistic or planned.	Medium
Employees/business partners	Fraud, information theft	Unlikely	Transfer information to external adversaries or fraud	Loyal employees may act under duress	Medium
Competitors	Reputational slander, information theft	Unlikely	Use of third parties, public record/media search	Increasing global trend	Low
Issue motivated groups	Block movement, reputational slander, denial of access, cyber attacks	Rare	Public record/media search, surveillance, occupation/protest/ high-profile stunts	Unlikely in Thailand	Low
Foreign governments	Information theft, exploitation	Unlikely	cyber attack, phone taps	Commercially motivated	Low
Terrorists	Kidnap, murder, extortion	Unlikely	Bombing, assassination	No history of targeting foreigners in Thailand	Very low

Threat assessment – Ms Bianca Rinehart including one young child, Vancouver, Canada and when travelling,

Suppression Order in Place

Potential adversary	Capability	Intention to act	Opportunity	Remarks	Threat level
Organised criminals	Extortion, kidnap, fraud, drug crimes, trafficking, murder	Unlikely	Financial extortion through intimidation of employees, attack on routine journeys after planning and surveillance	Asian triads, Colombian cartels, Mafia groups, Russian Mafia and Nigerian crime groups. The Hells Angels also have "enormous criminal clout" ⁶⁸	Low
Petty criminals	Assault, robbery, burglary, , kidnap	Possible	Incidental recognition during transit	Lifestyle may attract attention	Medium
Deranged persons	Murder, assault, deprivation of liberty, threatening behaviour	Unlikelye	Public record search, surveillance, incidental recognition	Emotional motivation. May be opportunistic or planned.	Low
Employees/business partners	Fraud, information theft	Unlikely	Transfer information to external adversaries or fraud	Loyal employees may act under duress	Low
Competitors	Reputational slander, information theft	Unlikley	Use of third parties, public record/media search	Increasing global trend	Low
Issue motivated groups	Block movement, reputational slander, denial of access, cyber attacks	Unlikely	Public record/media search, surveillance, occupation/protest/ high-profile stunts	An increasing global trend to target governments and wealthy individuals	Low
Foreign governments	Information theft, exploitation	Rare	Cyberattack, phone taps	Commercially motivated	Low
Terrorists	Kidnap, murder, extortion	Unlikely	Bombing, assassination	No history of targeting individuals in Canada	Very low

⁶⁸ Canadian Secret Intelligence Service Report into Organised Crime 2010

Threat assessment – Ms Bianca Rinehart including one young child, Vancouver, Canada and when travelling,

Suppression Order Lifted

Potential adversary	Capability	Intention to act	Opportunity	Remarks	Threat level
Organised criminals	Extortion, kidnap, fraud, drug crimes, trafficking, murder	Unlikely	Financial extortion through intimidation of employees, attack on routine journeys after planning and surveillance	Asian triads, Colombian cartels, Mafia groups, Russian Mafia and Nigerian crime groups. The Hells Angels also have "enormous criminal clout" ⁶⁹	Medium
Petty criminals	Assault, robbery, burglary, deprivation of liberty	Possible	Incidental recognition during transit	Increased recognition factor from media reporting	High
Deranged persons	Murder, assault, deprivation of liberty, threatening behaviour	Possible	Public record search, surveillance, incidental recognition	Emotional motivation fed by sensational media reporting. May be opportunistic or planned.	Medium
Employees/business partners	Fraud, information theft	Unlikely	Transfer information to external adversaries or fraud	Loyal employees may act under duress	Medium
Competitors	Reputational slander, information theft	Possible	Use of third parties, public record/media search	Increasing global trend	Low
Issue motivated groups	Block movement, reputational slander, denial of access, cyber attacks	Possible	Public record/media search, surveillance, occupation/protest/high-profile stunts	An increasing global trend to target governments and wealthy individuals	Medium
Foreign governments	Information theft, exploitation	Possible	cyber attack, phone taps	Commercially motivated	Low
Terrorists	Kidnap, murder, extortion	Unlikely	Bombing, assassination	No history of targeting individuals in Canada	Very low

⁶⁹ Op cit Canadian Secret Intelligence Service Report into Organized Crime 2010

Threat assessment – Ms Hope Welker Rinehart, New York, US, including two young children

Suppression Order in Place

Potential adversary	Capability	Intention to act	Opportunity	Remarks	Threat level
Organised criminals	Extortion, kidnap, fraud, drug crimes, trafficking, murder	Unlikely	Financial extortion through intimidation of employees, attack on routine journeys after planning and surveillance	Categories include 1. La Cosa Nostra, Italian organised crime, and racketeering 2. Eurasian/Middle Eastern organised crime 3. Asian and African criminal enterprises. ⁷⁰	Low
Petty criminals	Assault, robbery, burglary, kidnap	Possible	Incidental recognition during transit	Crime rates are low outside deprived urban areas. Lifestyle adds top threat level however	Medium
Deranged persons	Murder, assault, deprivation of liberty, threatening behaviour	Possible	Public record search, surveillance, incidental recognition	Emotional motivation. May be opportunistic or planned.	Low
Employees/business partners	Fraud, information theft	Unlikely	Transfer information to external adversaries or fraud	Loyal employees may act under duress	Low
Competitors	Reputational slander, information theft	Possible	Use of third parties, public record/media search	Increasing global trend	Low
Issue motivated groups	Block movement, reputational slander, denial of access, cyber attacks	Possible	Public record/media search, surveillance, occupation/protest/ high-profile stunts	An increasing global trend to target governments and wealthy individuals	Low
Foreign governments	Information theft, exploitation	Possible	Cyberattack, phone taps	Commercially motivated	Very Low
Terrorists	Kidnap, murder, extortion	Unlikely	Bombing, assassination	Low but credible risk of terrorist threats. Also from extremist environmentalists, animal rights militants and right-wing extremists.	Low

⁷⁰ Congressional Research Service, Organised Crime in the United States , Kirsten M Finklea 22 Dec 2010 page 16

Threat assessment – Ms Hope Welker Rinehart, New York, US, including two young children

Suppression Order Lifted

Potential adversary	Capability	Intention to act	Opportunity	Remarks	Threat level
Organised criminals	Extortion, kidnap, fraud, drug crimes, trafficking, murder	Unlikely	Financial extortion through intimidation of employees, attack on routine journeys after planning and surveillance Increased recognition from media reporting	Categories include 1. La Cosa Nostra, Italian organised crime, and racketeering 2. Eurasian/Middle Eastern organised crime 3. Asian and African criminal enterprises. ⁷¹	Medium
Petty criminals	Assault, robbery, burglary, kidnap	Possible	Incidental recognition during transit	Crime rates are low outside deprived urban areas. Lifestyle combined with sensational media reporting leads to high threat level	High
Deranged persons	Murder, assault, deprivation of liberty, threatening behaviour	Possible	Public record search, surveillance, incidental recognition	Emotional motivation. May be opportunistic or planned.	Medium
Employees/business partners	Fraud, information theft	Unlikely	Transfer information to external adversaries or fraud	Loyal employees may act under duress	Medium
Competitors	Reputational slander, information theft	Possible	Use of third parties, public record/media search	Increasing global trend	Low
Issue motivated groups	Block movement, reputational slander, denial of access, cyber attacks	Possible	Public record/media search, surveillance, occupation/protest/high-profile stunts	An increasing global trend to target governments and wealthy individuals	Medium
Foreign governments	Information theft, exploitation	Possible	Cyberattack, phone taps	Commercially motivated	Very Low
Terrorists	Kidnap, murder, extortion	Unlikely	Bombing, assassination	Low but credible risk of terrorist threats. Also from extremist environmentalists, animal rights militants and right-wing extremists.	Low

⁷¹ Congressional Research Service, Organised Crime in the United States , Kirsten M Finklea 22 Dec 2010 page 16

Threat assessment – Ms Ginia Rinehart, London, UK

Suppression Order in Place

Potential adversary	Capability	Intention to act	Opportunity	Remarks	Threat level
Organised criminals	Extortion, kidnap, fraud, drug crimes, trafficking, murder	Unlikely	Financial extortion through intimidation of employees, attack on routine journeys after planning and surveillance	During 2008/09, police forces reported 2,034 kidnappings to the Home Office, a slight increase (2%) on 2007/08. In practice, however, the true kidnapping figures are unknown. ⁷²	Low
Petty criminals	Assault, robbery, burglary, deprivation of liberty	Possible	Incidental recognition during transit	Petty crime is the most prominent security threat in the UK.	Low
Deranged persons	Murder, assault, deprivation of liberty, threatening behaviour	Possible	Public record search, surveillance, incidental recognition	Emotional motivation. May be opportunistic or planned.	Low
Employees/business partners	Fraud, information theft	Unlikely	Transfer information to external adversaries or fraud	Loyal employees may act under duress	Low
Competitors	Reputational slander, information theft	Possible	Use of third parties, public record/media search	Increasing global trend	Low
Issue motivated groups	Block movement, reputational slander, denial of access, cyber attacks	Possible	Public record/media search, surveillance, occupation/protest/high-profile stunts	An increasing global trend to target governments and wealthy individuals	Low
Foreign governments	Information theft, exploitation	Possible	Cyberattack, phone taps	Commercially motivated	Very Low
Terrorists	Kidnap, murder, extortion	Unlikely	Bombing, assassination	The most serious security risk is posed by terrorism – both transnational and domestic, but a strong security and intelligence response mitigates this risk.	Low

⁷² Serious Organised Crime Agency <http://www.soca.gov.uk/threats/kidnap-and-extortion>

Threat assessment – Ms Ginia Rinehart, London, UK and travelling

Suppression Order Lifted

Potential adversary	Capability	Intention to act	Opportunity	Remarks	Threat level
Organised criminals	Extortion, kidnap, fraud, drug crimes, trafficking, murder	Unlikely	Financial extortion through intimidation of employees, attack on routine journeys after planning and surveillance	During 2008/09, police forces reported 2,034 kidnappings to the Home Office, a slight increase (2%) on 2007/08. In practice, however, the true kidnapping figures are unknown. ⁷³	Medium
Petty criminals	Assault, robbery, burglary, deprivation of liberty	Possible	Incidental recognition during transit	Petty crime is the most prominent security threat in the UK.	High
Deranged persons	Murder, assault, deprivation of liberty, threatening behaviour	Possible	Public record search, surveillance, incidental recognition	Emotional motivation fed by sensationalist reporting. May be opportunistic or planned.	Medium
Employees/business partners	Fraud, information theft	Unlikely	Transfer information to external adversaries or fraud	Loyal employees may act under duress	Medium
Competitors	Reputational slander, information theft	Possible	Use of third parties, public record/media search	Increasing global trend	Low
Issue motivated groups	Block movement, reputational slander, denial of access, cyber attacks	Possible	Public record/media search, surveillance, occupation/protest/high-profile stunts	An increasing global trend to target governments and wealthy individuals	Medium
Foreign governments	Information theft, exploitation	Possible	Cyberattack, phone taps	Commercially motivated	Very Low
Terrorists	Kidnap, murder, extortion	Unlikely	Bombing, assassination	The most serious security risk is posed by terrorism – both transnational and domestic, but a strong security and intelligence response mitigates this risk.	Low

⁷³ Serious Organised Crime Agency <http://www.soca.gov.uk/threats/kidnap-and-extortion>

Annex B – Comparative risk assessment

Mrs Gina Rinehart

Risk	Suppression			No Suppression			Remarks
	L	E	Rating	L	E	Rating	
Residential risk – robbery	1	2	Low	23	2	Medium	Lifting suppression order increases risks for residential and workplace harassment and travel risk robbery
Residential risk – assault/murder	1	5	High	1	5	High	
Residential risk – protest, blockade, denial of access	2	2	Low	2	2	Low	
Residential risk – harassment	2	2	Low	3	2	Medium	
Travel risk – robbery	2	3	Medium	3	3	High	
Travel risk – assault	1	4	Medium	2	4	Medium	
Travel risk – abduction, kidnap	1	4	Medium	2	4	Medium	
Travel risk – harassment	2	3	Medium	2	3	Medium	
Work place risk – robbery	2	3	Medium	2	3	Medium	
Workplace risk – assault/murder	1	5	High	1	5	High	
Workplace risk – harassment	2	3	Medium	3	3	High	

Mr John Hancock and two young children – Thailand

Risk	Suppression			No Suppression			Remarks
	L	E	Rating	L	E	Rating	
Residential risk – robbery	1	2	Low	2	3	Medium	Lifting suppression order increases risks for abduction and kidnap for ransom
Residential risk – assault/murder	1	5	High	2	5	Extreme	
Residential risk – protest, blockade, denial of access	2	2	Low	2	2	Low	
Residential risk – harassment	2	2	Low	3	2	Medium	
Travel risk – robbery	2	3	Medium	2	3	Medium	
Travel risk – assault	1	4	Medium	2	4	Medium	
Travel risk – abduction, kidnap	2	4	Medium	3	4	High	
Travel risk – harassment	2	3	Medium	2	3	Medium	
Work place risk – robbery	2	3	Medium	2	3	Medium	
Workplace risk – assault/murder	1	5	High	1	5	High	
Workplace risk – harassment	2	3	Medium	3	3	High	

Ms Bianca Rinehart and one young children – Vancouver

Risk	Suppression			No Suppression			Remarks
	L	E	Rating	L	E	Rating	
Residential risk – robbery	1	3	Low	2	3	Medium	Lifting suppression order increases risks for robbery, protest, harassment, abduction and kidnap
Residential risk – assault/murder	1	5	High	1	5	High	
Residential risk – protest, blockade, denial of access	2	2	Low	2	3	Medium	
Residential risk – harassment	2	2	Low	3	2	Medium	
Travel risk – robbery	2	3	Medium	2	3	Medium	
Travel risk – assault	1	4	Medium	2	4	Medium	
Travel risk – abduction, kidnap	2	4	Medium	3	4	High	
Travel risk – harassment	2	3	Medium	2	3	Medium	
Work place risk – robbery	2	3	Medium	2	3	Medium	
Workplace risk – assault/murder	1	5	High	1	5	High	
Workplace risk – harassment	2	3	Medium	3	3	High	

Ms Hope Welker Rinehart including two young children – New York USA

Risk	Suppression			No Suppression			Remarks
	L	E	Rating	L	E	Rating	
Residential risk – robbery	1	2	Low	2	3	Medium	Lifting suppression order increases risks for robbery, protest, harassment, abduction and kidnap
Residential risk – assault/murder	1	5	High	1	5	High	
Residential risk – protest, blockade, denial of access	2	2	Low	2	2	Low	
Residential risk – harassment	2	2	Low	3	2	Medium	
Travel risk – robbery	2	3	Medium	2	3	Medium	
Travel risk – assault	1	4	Medium	2	4	Medium	
Travel risk – abduction, kidnap	2	4	Medium	3	4	High	
Travel risk – harassment	2	3	Medium	2	3	Medium	
Work place risk – robbery	2	3	Medium	2	3	Medium	
Workplace risk – assault/murder	1	5	High	1	5	High	
Workplace risk – harassment	2	3	Medium	3	3	High	

Ms Ginia Rinehart – London UK

Risk	Suppression			No Suppression			Remarks
	L	E	Rating	L	E	Rating	
Residential risk – robbery	1	2	Low	2	3	Medium	Lifting suppression order increases risks for robbery, protest, harassment, abduction and kidnap
Residential risk – assault/murder	1	5	High	1	5	High	
Residential risk – protest, blockade, denial of access	2	2	Low	2	2	Low	
Residential risk – harassment	2	2	Low	3	2	Medium	
Travel risk – robbery	2	3	Medium	2	3	Medium	
Travel risk – assault	1	4	Medium	2	4	Medium	
Travel risk – abduction, kidnap	2	4	Medium	3	4	High	
Travel risk – harassment	2	3	Medium	2	3	Medium	
Work place risk – robbery	2	3	Medium	2	3	Medium	
Workplace risk – assault/murder	1	5	High	1	5	High	
Workplace risk – harassment	2	3	Medium	3	3	High	

Annex C – Classification of risk

The identified security threats are assessed according to the qualitative scales for *Likelihood* and *Consequences* in the following table. The table is based on the following standards: ISO 31000:2009 Risk management – Principles and guidelines and HB 167:2006 Security risk management.

Likelihood		Consequence	
1 Rare	Only occur in exceptional circumstances. No recorded incidents or anecdotal evidence of occurrence; and/or No recent incidents in other like establishments elsewhere. Virtually no opportunity, reason or means to occur.	1 Insignificant	Measurable financial effect, less than \$10,000 and/or Negligible effect on operations. No local public image influence. No influence on staff morale/ productivity.
2 Unlikely	Could occur at some time but not expected. One or two recorded incidents in the past at like establishments; and/or unsubstantiated anecdotal evidence of occurrence; and/or Some opportunity, reason or means to occur.	2 Minor	Measurable cost, between \$10,000 and \$100,000 and/or A complaint or interruption and/or One or two injuries or medical reports. Reported minor local public image influence. Reported but insignificant influence on staff morale/ productivity.
3 Possible	Might occur at some time – Occurrences have been recorded in a 12-month period. Few, infrequent random recorded incidents at like establishments; Some anecdotal evidence of occurrence; and/or known opportunity, reason or means to occur.	3 Moderate	Measurable cost, between \$100,000 & \$1,000,000: Some complaints or interruptions and/or Small number of injuries or medical reports. Possible loss of community standing. Minor influence on staff morale/ productivity.
4 Likely	Will probably occur in most circumstances. Incidents have been recorded or a trend has been established; and/or Strong anecdotal evidence from a variety of sources from and/or Considerable opportunity, reason or means to occur.	4 Major	Could noticeably impact; Cost between \$1,000,000 and \$10,000,000, and/or Widespread stakeholder dissatisfaction and media attention and/or Very severe injuries, and/or Long delays or interruptions to operations, and/or Serious public relations damage, requiring considerable effort to rectify, and/or Litigation, and/or Noticeable loss of community standing for future operations, and/or Noticeable influence on staff morale/ productivity.

Likelihood		Consequence	
5 Almost Certain	Level of reported incidents indicates an endemic situation or a sustained campaign against ; and/or A strong likelihood of future occurrence, because of identified circumstances; and/or Great opportunity, reason or means to occur	5 Catastrophic	Very serious disruption to operations, impacting on the continuity. Long-term effectiveness of adversely affected, with costs over \$10,000,000 and/or At least one death and widespread injuries and property damage and/or Community standing very seriously affected, requiring very concentrated effort and cost to rectify afterwards and/or Class action and individual litigation claims and/or major influence on staff morale/productivity and ability to perform their duties

Security risk rating look-up matrix

An overall rating for each risk is obtained from the look-up table below. For each of the combinations, there is an overall risk rating of **Low, Moderate, High, or Extreme** as shown in the matrix.

Likelihood label	Consequences label				
	1 Insignificant	2 Minor	3 Moderate	4 Major	5 Catastrophic
5 Almost Certain	Medium	High	High	Extreme	Extreme
4 Likely	Medium	Medium	High	High	Extreme
3 Possible	Low	Medium	High	High	High
2 Unlikely	Low	Low	Medium	Medium	High
1 Rare	Low	Low	Medium	Medium	High

Inherent risk versus residual risk ratings

The *inherent risk* ratings are for those risks to an organisation where risk treatment measures are assumed to be absent.

The *residual risk* ratings are for those risks to an organisation where the recommended risk mitigation strategies identified in the risk register table are applied. Residual risk has not been considered within this table as mitigation strategies have not yet been clearly identified/implemented.

Inherent risk – Threat management action required

When the overall rating is determined, business and security management systems, policies, procedures and contingency plans must detail the risk management treatments required to manage risks rated **Medium** or above.

It should also reflect that the following actions have been taken and that appropriate management actions are made.

E	Extreme risks	Comprehensive treatment required. Activity should be stopped until risk can be reduced.
H	High risks	Immediate action required. Risk owner should be recognised and treatment plan drawn up and implemented. There should be no delay in reducing this risk
M	Medium risks	Action required. Risk treatment plan should be produced and risk owner assigned.
L	Low risks	Risk mitigation measures should be considered and implemented. Risks managed by routine procedures.

Annex D Media statistics

Control Risks have briefly examined the statistics on the number of media articles surrounding Gina Rinehart ('Gina') and her family. These statistics have been prepared using online media databases. Unless otherwise noted the searches below have been conducted on all available publications in the databases and have not been restricted to any specific country or region.

Gina Rinehart

A search for all media articles relating to Gina indicates that there are a total of 6,356 articles associated with her in online media databases. Of these articles, 3,129 were generated between 1 January 2010 and 31 January 2012. No articles mentioning Gina were located prior to 1992, and the average number of articles per year in the 1990s was 78. Between 1 January 2000 and 31 December 2009 the average number of articles per year was 307. It should be noted that these articles are not all specifically about Gina, but include mentions of her including ownership of shares, appearances on lists of wealthy Australians and other incidental mentions.

John Hancock

Searches for all media articles relating to John Hancock ('John'), previously known as John Rinehart, are complicated by several factors. These factors are briefly outlined below:

- John Hancock was one of the founding fathers of the United States of America, and is therefore extensively mentioned in articles and web news discussing American history.
- "John Hancock" is a colloquial expression for the signature of a person.
- Both the names John Hancock and John Rinehart are common to a number of other individuals.

In order to prepare an accurate figure of news articles relating specifically to John, Control Risks would need to conduct a detailed examination of articles. Initial indications, however, are that John is generally only mentioned in articles with other members of his family, so the figure pertaining specifically to him will not exceed those of other family members.

Bianca Rinehart

A search for all media articles relating to Bianca Rinehart ('Bianca') reveals that there she has been mentioned in 163 articles held on online media databases. The first article located in relation to her was from 2002, with the most recent being on 31 January 2012.

Hope Welker Rinehart

A search for all media articles relating to Hope Welker Rinehart ('Hope'), which also included the names "Hope Rinehart" and "Hope Rinehart Welker", reveals that there have been 233 mentions of this name on online media databases. It is believed, however, that several of these articles pertain to persons other than Hope, as at least one individual in the United States shares a similar name. The first article located in relation to Hope specifically was from 1997, with the most recent being on 30 January 2012. Control Risks notes that the majority of coverage in relation to Hope has occurred between September 2011 and January 2012, with 201 articles located in that period.

Ginia Rinehart

A search for all media articles relating to Ginia Rinehart ('Ginia') reveals that she has been mentioned in 58 articles held on online media databases. The first article located in relation to her was from 13 July 2011, with the most recent being 31 January 2012.

Comparative figures

Control Risks notes that during research, several well-known identities in the Australian resources sector were searched to ascertain the level of their media profile:

- Andrew Forrest, the West Australian mining magnate, returns in excess of 15,000 articles, ranging from 1983 until 2012.
- Frank Lowy, the chairman of the Westfield Group, returns in excess of 18,000 articles, ranging from 1983 until 2012.
- Kerry Stokes, the Australian media mogul, returns in excess of 27,000 articles, ranging from 1982 to 2012.
- Nathan Tinkler, the Hunter Valley based mining magnate, has been the subject of over 6,000 articles from 2006 until

Annex E Media Images

Introduction

Control Risks has obtained the following media photographs of members of the Rinehart family.

Photograph 1: Gina Rinehart



(Source: *Adelaide Now*, 8 December 2010)

Photograph 2: The Rinehart children



(Source: *Weekend West*, 8 October 2011)

Photograph 3: John Hancock



(Source: *Weekend West*, 8 October 2011)

Photograph 4: Bianca Rinehart



(Source: *NT News*, 11 January 2012)

Photograph 5: Hope Welker Rinehart



(Source: CDC Media Group, 9 September 2011)

Photograph 6: Ginia Rinehart



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